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INTRODUCTION 
In 2003, the Federal Circuit issued thirty five published opinions 
involving government contract law issues.  For this article, the 
decisions have been grouped into the following subject matters:  
damages, default, costs, contract interpretation, duress, and bid 
protests.  This article will emphasize those decisions which the author 
believes will most likely affect the greatest volume of future litigated 
cases.  Among the various decisions handed down by the Federal 
Circuit in 2003, the court issued important precedential opinions 
regarding damages, default, and costs issues. 
I.  DAMAGES—THE EICHLEAY DECISIONS 
A.  P.J. Dick Inc. v. Principi 
The use of the Eichleay formula to calculate unabsorbed home 
office overhead has been the subject of intense debate in the 
government contract arena.1  Since the seminal decision of C.B.C. 
Enterprises, Inc. v. United States2 in 1992 limiting the use of the Eichleay 
formula to calculate unabsorbed home office overhead, the Federal 
Circuit has published fifteen decisions concerning its use—including 
three in 2003.3  Two of the 2003 “Eichleay” decisions reflect the 
                                                          
 1. See Ralph C. Nash & John Cibinic, Unabsorbed Overhead and the “Eichleay” 
Formula:  Rampant Confusion, 16 NASH & CIBINIC REP. ¶ 23 (2002) [hereinafter Nash & 
Cibinic, Rampant Confusion] (explaining that the Eichleay formula produces 
significant complexities in pricing the claims of constructing contractors); Ralph C. 
Nash & John Cibinic, Unabsorbed Overhead:  Abandon Eichleay, 13 NASH & CIBINIC REP. 
¶ 33 (1999) (arguing that the Federal Circuit should abandon the use of the Eichleay 
formula and create a better means of calculating fixed-cost delay damages); David G. 
Anderson, Practitioner’s Viewpoint:  Federal Circuit Creates an Invalid Legal Test for 
Determining Entitlement to Unabsorbed Overhead, 26 PUB. CONT. L.J. 353, 369, 371 (1997) 
(contending that the Eichleay formula unfairly places the burden of proof on the 
government to show that the contractor was able to take on other work, thereby 
forcing the government to engage in lengthy and expensive discovery that may 
produce windfall recoveries for some contractors); Patrick A. McGeehin & Carleton 
O. Strouss, Learning from Eichleay:  Unabsorbed Overhead Claims in State and Local 
Jurisdictions, 25 PUB. CONT. L.J. 351, 353 (1996) (proposing that state and local 
jurisdictions adopt the principles of Eichleay to provide a more uniform formula for 
computing unabsorbed overhead); Colonel Killham, Federal Circuit Endorses Eichleay, 
ARMY LAW., July 1994, at 37 (stating that the Eichleay formula can assist contracting 
officers by placing limits on contractors’ ability to increase overhead pools or 
allocation formulas); Major Tomanelli, The Eichleay Formula—Struggling to Survive, 
ARMY LAW., Dec. 1993, at 46-48 (outlining three arguments that can limit the 
applicability of the Eichleay formula so that contracting officers will not reimburse 
contractors unnecessarily).  
 2. 978 F.2d 669 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 3. P.J. Dick Inc. v. Principi, 324 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also Charles G. 
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continuing difficulty created by the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence in 
this area, and mark important developments in the case law. 
In P.J. Dick Inc. v. Principi,4 the contractor appealed the Department 
of Veterans Affairs Board of Contract Appeals decision denying P.J. 
Dick’s (“PJD”) claims for unabsorbed home office overhead damages.  
During performance of the construction contract, the government 
issued over 400 change orders, causing delays to various aspects of 
the project.5  The Board granted PJD a time extension and damages 
for field overhead costs.6  However, the Board denied PJD Eichleay 
unabsorbed home office overhead damages because PJD did not 
prove it was on “standby.”7  The Board also ruled that a stipulation 
entered by the parties addressed only Eichleay quantum and not 
Eichleay entitlement.8  The Federal Circuit framed the unabsorbed 
overhead issues by stating that “[t]he primary issues here are whether 
the parties’ stipulation entitled PJD to recovery of home office 
overhead and, if not, whether PJD had shown the [government] 
placed it on standby.”9 
Rather than first addressing the stipulation, the court instead 
addressed the standby issue.10  The court spent three pages clarifying 
ten years of Federal Circuit precedent on the standby requirement 
for an Eichleay recovery.11  The analysis attempted to reconcile 
inconsistent language in earlier decisions that supported the position 
that suspension of work and idleness are not prerequisites for a 
standby finding.12  Finding the standby inquiry multifaceted, the court 
explained that the standby element is met if the contracting officer 
                                                          
Williams Constr., Inc. v. White, 326 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Nicon, Inc. v. United 
States, 331 F.3d 878 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Charles G. Williams Constr., Inc. v. White, 271 
F.3d 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Sauer, Inc. v. Danzig, 224 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2000); 
Melka Marine, Inc. v. United States, 187 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1999); E.R. Mitchell 
Constr. Co. v. Danzig, 175 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1999); West v. All State Boiler, Inc., 
146 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Satellite Elec. Co. v. Dalton, 105 F.3d 1418 (Fed. Cir. 
1997); Altmayer v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 1129 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Mech-Con Corp. v. West, 
61 F.3d 883 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Wickham Contracting Co., Inc. v. Fischer, 12 F.3d 1574 
(Fed. Cir. 1994); Interstate Gen. Gov’t Contractors, Inc. v. West, 12 F.3d 1053 (Fed. 
Cir. 1993); Daly Constr., Inc. v. Garrett, 5 F.3d 520 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Cmty. Heating & 
Plumbing Co., Inc. v. Kelso, 987 F.2d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1993).   
 4. 324 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 5. Id. at 1368. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 1369 (emphasis added). 
 10. Id. at 1370.  The Federal Circuit ruled later in the opinion that a stipulation 
between the parties regarding the damages calculations rendered unnecessary any 
proof of entitlement to Eichleay damages by the contractor.  Id. at 1374. 
 11. Id. at 1371-73. 
 12. Id. at 1371-72. 
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has issued a written order:  (1) suspending all work on the contract 
for an uncertain duration, and (2) requiring the contractor to 
resume work immediately or on short notice.13  Because many 
suspension orders likely will not state that the contractor must 
resume work immediately or on short notice, the Federal Circuit’s 
discussion of how to prove standby status with indirect evidence will 
likely generate more “Eichleay” litigation in the future.14 
Absent written orders containing the explicit directive referenced 
above, the Federal Circuit further explained that the contractor must 
prove standby with indirect evidence, including evidence that:  
(1) the substantial government-caused delay was of an indefinite 
duration; (2) during the delay the contractor had to be prepared to 
resume work immediately and at full speed; and (3) the contractor 
effectively suspended most or all of the contract work.15  Noting that 
case law has not addressed the second element of the standby test in 
detail,16 the court’s discussion of this element in the context of 
(a) calculating a reasonable amount of time to remobilize, 
(b) remobilizing with a reduced work force, and (c) keeping some 
equipment and men at the work site17 will invite further disputes 
between contractors and the government. 
It is difficult to understand why proof for an Eichleay claim should 
include the requirement that a contractor on standby must be 
prepared to resume work immediately and at full speed.  If a 
suspension order tells a contractor to anticipate resuming work in 
three months, that advance notice does not make it any easier for the 
contractor to find replacement revenue for that three month period 
to absorb its project management personnel and bonding capacity 
than if no such notice was provided.  A contractor will not find a new 
job for its management staff to replace the loss of revenue caused by 
the suspension simply because it knows that the suspension will end 
three months later.  With or without notice that the suspended work 
will resume in three months, the contractor suffers the same loss of 
revenue stream to absorb overhead.  If a contractor is told that the 
suspension will end two years later, this requirement may be 
reasonable because the contractor may have an opportunity to find 
substitute work.  It is unreasonable if the contractor’s bonding 
                                                          
 13. Id. at 1371. 
 14. See Nash & Cibinic, Rampant Confusion, supra note 2, ¶ 23 (proposing two 
ways to simplify the calculation of damages and satisfying the standby requirement, 
which limit the amount of complex litigation). 
 15. P.J. Dick Inc., 324 F.3d at 1371. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
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capacity is tied up during the two year work period by the suspended 
work.  Thus, the court imposed another rigid requirement without 
regard to how the facts of a particular case should govern the award 
of damages. 
Concerning the third element of the standby test, partial 
suspensions are more likely than total suspensions of work.  In 
addition, a total suspension of a subcontractor’s work is more likely 
than a total suspension of the general prime contract.  Thus, the 
court’s discussion of whether the continued performance involved 
“only insubstantial work on the contract”18 will likely face further 
litigation under this element of the standby test.  The standby rule 
has nothing to do with the economics or accounting of unabsorbed 
overhead,19 and the standby requirements in P.J. Dick further 
complicate the analysis, likely engendering further litigation.  
Whether these new requirements sound the “death knell” of 
Eichleay,20 they certainly make it much more difficult to recover 
Eichleay damages. 
The Federal Circuit imposed a relatively simple, logical limitation 
of Eichleay in C.B.C. Enterprises by finding that Eichleay should not be 
applied automatically to all delays.21  The court ruled that Eichleay 
should only apply when the government suspends, disrupts, or delays 
a contract in a manner that imposes uncertainty on the contractor.22  
Although the Eichleay formula is intended to simplify the calculation 
of overhead costs,23 the Federal Circuit’s requirements in P.J. Dick 
have not simplified the process: 
In short, a court evaluating a contractor’s claim for Eichleay 
damages should ask the following questions:  (1) was there a 
government-caused delay that was not concurrent with another 
delay caused by some other source; (2) did the contractor 
demonstrate that it incurred additional overhead (i.e., was the 
original time frame for completion extended or did the contractor 
satisfy the Interstate three-part test); (3) did the government 
                                                          
 18. Id. at 1372. 
 19. Nash & Cibinic, Rampant Confusion, supra note 2, ¶ 23. 
 20. Ralph C. Nash & John Cibinic, Postscript:  Unabsorbed Overhead and the 
“Eichleay” Formula, 17 NASH & CIBINIC REP. ¶¶ 33, 87 (2003) (arguing that the P.J. Dick 
Inc. decision severely diminishes the ability of contractors to recover unabsorbed 
overhead under the standby rule).  
 21. C.B.C. Enters., Inc. v. United States, 978 F.2d 669, 675 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Nicon, Inc. v. United States, 331 F.3d 878, 889 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., 
concurring in part); see also Nash & Cibinic, Rampant Confusion, supra note 2, ¶ 23 
(contending that although the calculation of Eichleay damages is not complex, 
recent court decisions and the standby requirement unnecessarily increase the 
complexity of litigation). 
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[contracting officer] issue a suspension or other order expressly 
putting the contractor on standby; (4) if not, can the contractor 
prove there was a delay of indefinite duration during which it could 
not bill substantial amounts of work on the contract and at the end 
of which it was required to be able to return to work on the 
contract at full speed and immediately; (5) can the government 
satisfy its burden of production showing that it was not impractical 
for the contractor to take on replacement work (i.e., a new 
contract) and thereby mitigate its damages; and (6) if the 
government meets its burden of production, can the contractor 
satisfy its burden of persuasion that it was impractical for it to 
obtain sufficient replacement work.  Only where the above exacting 
requirements can be satisfied will a contractor be entitled to 
Eichleay damages.24 
It is unlikely that a contractor could recover under these 
requirements given the facts in the numerous cases cited with 
approval in C.B.C. Enterprises where Eichleay damages were 
recovered.25  The legal hurdles summarized in P.J. Dick are not linked 
to the practical accounting proof established in C.B.C. Enterprises, 
which required the contractor to prove that the government caused 
delays of uncertain length and reduced the contractor’s flow of direct 
cost stream of revenue.  Rather than making questions (2)-(6) in the 
P.J. Dick analysis legal requirements for recovery, they should serve as 
factors to consider in determining whether the evidence satisfies the 
two basic tests for entitlement under C.B.C. Enterprises:  (1) did 
government-caused delay of an uncertain duration cause a reduction 
in the contractor’s stream of direct costs, and (2) did the contractor 
mitigate or could have mitigated the unabsorbed overhead damages 
caused by the delay. 
The C.B.C. Enterprises test is whether government-caused delay 
creates uncertainty which prevents the contractor from taking on 
more work to generate additional direct cost revenue to replace and 
                                                          
 24. P.J. Dick Inc., 324 F.3d at 1373 (emphasis in original). 
 25. “See, e.g., Weaver-Bailey Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 19 Cl. Ct. 474, 477 
(1990); A.A. Beiro Constr. Co., 91-3 B.C.A. (CCH) ¶ 24,149, ¶ 120,844 (ENGBCA 
1991); Cieszko Constr. Co., 88-1 B.C.A. (CCH) ¶ 20,223, ¶ 102,417 (ASBCA 1987); 
Shirley Contracting Corp., 85-1 B.C.A. (CCH) ¶ 17,858, ¶¶ 89,399-400 (ABCA 1984); 
Excavation-Constr., Inc., 82-1 B.C.A. (CCH) ¶ 15,770, ¶¶ 78,067-68 (ENGBCA 1982); 
Savoy Constr. Co., 85-2 B.C.A. (CCH) ¶ 18,073, ¶ 90,723 (ASBCA 1985).  See also 
Williams Enters., Inc. v. Sherman R. Smoot Co., 938 F.2d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1991).  In all 
these cases when disruption, suspension or delay caused by the government has 
reduced the stream of direct costs in a contract, it is appropriate to use the Eichleay 
formula to calculate extended home office overhead instead of the fixed percentage 
rate formula because the latter would not adequately compensate the contractor for 
extended home office overhead.” C.B.C. Enters., Inc., 978 F.2d at 674 (internal 
parentheticals eliminated). 
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absorb the delayed contract’s share of home office overhead.  The 
practical proof normally should be whether the contractor’s bonding 
capacity, or key contract management, or equipment is tied up by the 
delayed contract preventing the contractor from replacing that 
contract’s direct revenue stream with other work.  The P.J. Dick 
“standby” requirements unnecessarily undermine the logic and 
rationale of C.B.C. Enterprises.   
B.  Charles G. Williams Construction, Inc. v. White 
Twenty-five days after P.J. Dick, the Federal Circuit issued its 
decision in Charles G. Williams Construction, Inc. v. White.26  This 
decision involved the second appeal of a contractor’s claim for 
Eichleay damages.  On the first appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated 
the decision by the Armed Services Board of Contract, which denied 
Williams’ Eichleay claim, and remanded for the Board to discuss the 
two prerequisites a contractor must show to recover Eichleay 
damages:  (1) the contractor was on standby during the delay, and 
(2) it was unable to take on other work during the delay.27 
On remand, the Board again denied the contractor’s Eichleay 
claim, finding that Williams had not shown suspension or significant 
interruption of work performance during the period of delay 
involved.28  The Board based its finding on a Defense Contract 
Auditor Agency auditor’s report and credible testimony that Williams 
could not show it had a reduction in the flow of direct costs.29  Rather, 
the contract continued to absorb its equitable share of general and 
administrative expenses.30  The Federal Circuit rejected the 
contractor’s assertion that Eichleay applies if government delay 
causes inefficient performance as continued performance permits 
the absorption of indirect costs.31 
C.  Nicon, Inc. v. United States 
A month after Charles G. Williams Construction, the Federal Circuit 
issued Nicon, Inc. v. United States.32  In this case, the Army awarded 
Nicon a construction contract on March 30, 1998.33  Subsequently, a 
different bidder protested the award and the Army instructed Nicon 
                                                          
 26. 326 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 27. Id. at 1379-80. 
 28. Id. at 1378. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 1380-81. 
 32. 331 F.3d 878 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 33. Id. at 881. 
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to suspend all work.34  The protest was dismissed on July 15, 1988.35  
Despite Nicon’s requests to proceed with the contract, the Army did 
not proceed with the contract and terminated it for convenience on 
January 12, 1999.36  When Nicon submitted a termination settlement 
proposal, the contracting officer paid direct costs plus mark up, but 
denied a modified Eichleay claim for unabsorbed home office 
overhead.37  Nicon filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims (“CFC”).38  
The CFC granted summary judgment for the government because 
Wickham Contracting Co. v. Fischer39 did not permit the court to accept 
a modified Eichleay formula.40 
The Federal Circuit vacated the CFC’s decision and remanded the 
case to the CFC to determine whether there was government-caused 
delay of uncertain duration and whether Nicon was on standby 
during the period of delay.41  The Federal Circuit held that it could 
not apply the Eichleay formula for the relief sought because, absent 
any performance, it had no billings to apply in the formula.42  
However, if contract performance has not begun, the Federal Circuit 
held the contractor may recover unabsorbed overhead costs in a 
termination for convenience settlement “if a reasonable method of 
allocation can be determined on the facts of the case and the 
contractor can otherwise satisfy the strict prerequisites for recovery of 
unabsorbed overhead costs.”43 
The concurring opinion by Judge Newman disagreed about the 
inapplicability of Eichleay and suggested that a modified Eichleay 
formula may be appropriate.44  Judge Newman’s concurring opinion 
noted that: 
The Eichleay formula is not a matter of legal entitlement; it is 
simply a mathematical equation for allocation of unreimbursed 
overhead costs.  It is incorrect to promote it to a substantive 
entitlement limited to an inflexible formula . . . .  If the formula 
does not precisely fit the circumstances, this does not warrant 
either dismissal of the claim or determination that the Eichleay 
                                                          
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 882. 
 38. Id. 
 39. 12 F.3d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 40. Nicon, Inc., 331 F.3d at 887-88. 
 41. Id. at 887. 
 42. Id. at 884-85. 
 43. Id. at 888. 
 44. Id. at 889 (Newman, J., concurring in part) (observing that the court had 
previously recognized the potential application of close variations of the Eichleay 
formula). 
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formula is inapplicable; rather, it warrants adaptation, if such is 
needed, to the situation as it existed.45 
Elevating the Eichleay formula to a substantive entitlement limited 
to an inflexible formula is precisely what the Federal Circuit did in 
Wickham Contracting Co., Inc. v. Fischer and its progeny by insisting 
Eichleay is the only permissible calculation for determining claims of 
unabsorbed overhead.46  In Wickham Contracting Co., the Federal 
Circuit cited no empirical data to support its conclusion that Eichleay 
is the only means to fairly measure unabsorbed overhead.  Although it 
is an equitable method, that does not mean it is the only method.  
Eichleay was devised to apply to construction contracts.  It is not 
necessarily the appropriate measure for disruptions to a 
manufacturer’s shop overhead or to other non-construction 
businesses.  There are other methods available for evaluating 
unabsorbed overhead claims.47  Whether they should be utilized or 
not should depend upon the facts of each case.  However, by judicial 
fiat, the Federal Circuit declared that a contractor cannot use any 
other means to prove unabsorbed overhead damages, without any 
industry-accepted support that only the Eichleay formula can 
measure such damages in all cases.  Reasonably limiting the 
application of Eichleay is one thing.  Precluding contractors from 
proving unabsorbed overhead damages by any other reasonable 
means is quite another. 
The trial court in Nicon had no option but to reject the contractor’s 
unabsorbed overhead claims because Federal Circuit Eichleay 
jurisprudence prohibited the trial court from fairly addressing the 
contractor’s claims through other methods of calculating damages.48  
Fortunately, the Federal Circuit’s majority opinion allows some 
allocation method other than Eichleay in a very limited situation, i.e., 
where no work has been performed.49  Judge Newman’s concurring 
                                                          
 45. Id. at 889-90. 
 46. Wickham Contracting Co., Inc. v. Fischer, 12 F.3d 1574, 1580-81 (Fed. Cir. 
1994) (finding that the Eichleay formula provided an equitable means of calculating 
unabsorbed overhead damages without imposing additional costs on taxpayers and 
promoting its  exclusive use where the Eichleay prerequisites are met). 
 47. See Patrick A. McGeehin, Learning from Eichleay:  Unabsorbed Overhead Claims in 
State and Local Jurisdictions, 25 PUB. CONT. L.J. 351, 358-59 (1996) (providing 
examples of alternate approaches to calculating unabsorbed overhead claims). 
 48. See Nash & Cibinic, supra note 20, at 87 (arguing that courts should abandon 
the Eichleay formula and the stringent standby rule, which severely limits a 
contractor’s ability to recover unabsorbed overhead, and gives contractors the 
burden of proof, but noting that Federal Circuit precedent prevents this approach). 
 49. See Nicon, Inc., 331 F.3d at 888 (holding that in situations where contract 
performance has not yet begun, the contractor may recover unabsorbed overhead 
costs if a reasonable method of allocation may be determined on the facts of the 
case). 
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opinion in Nicon correctly argues that Eichleay should be a method of 
allocation—not a rule of law.50  In any event, the opinions in Nicon 
provide a glimmer of hope that the Federal Circuit will eventually 
recognize that contractors should be allowed to prove their 
unabsorbed overhead damages claims by any evidence or formula 
which fairly measures the home office damage caused by government 
delays. 
II.  DAMAGES—MODIFIED TOTAL COST METHOD 
Propellex Corp. v. Brownlee51 involved two fixed-price supply contracts 
for primers, a component of gun shells containing black powder.52  
The contracts required submission of samples of primers to test the 
moisture content of the black powder,53 and the Army subsequently 
determined that the moisture content of the primers was too high 
and rejected many primers.54  During the following two years, the 
contractor conducted an investigation to determine the cause of the 
moisture and found no evidence that the moisture content exceeded 
the specified level.55  During this two-year period, the contractor 
continued primer production, the government rejected three 
additional lots, and the contractor diverted production employees to 
investigate the moisture problem.56 
Subsequently, an observation team found defects in the 
government’s testing procedure for the fifth lot of primers, and the 
Army eventually accepted all the primers produced by Propellex.57  
Propellex filed a claim for equitable adjustment for $1.8 million 
using the modified total cost method for the costs it incurred by 
conducting the moisture investigation, as well as costs incurred by 
testing the moisture content of the primers prior to this delivery.58  
Although the contractor kept test records during the two-year 
investigative period, the records did not track the hours or materials 
spent investigating the moisture issue raised by the Army.59  The 
contracting officer agreed that the Army erroneously tested the 
                                                          
 50. Id. at 889 (Newman, J., concurring in part) (arguing that courts should be 
more flexible when determining whether the application of the Eichleay formula is 
appropriate). 
 51. 342 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 52. Id. at 1336. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 1337. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
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samples, awarded $77,325, and denied the balance of the claim based 
upon insufficient support for the additional costs claimed by 
Propellex.60  Propellex appealed to the Armed Services Board of 
Contract Appeals, which awarded claim preparation and consulting 
expenses, but denied the balance of Propellex’s claim for the 
moisture investigation for lack of proof of its modified total cost 
claim.61  While the contractor adjusted its claim by deducting 
amounts for bid errors and costs for which it admitted responsibility, 
the Board found that Propellex failed to establish two of the four 
requirements for the total cost method, i.e., the impracticability of 
directly proving its actual losses, and Propellex’s lack of responsibility 
for the added costs.62 
The contractor appealed the Board’s reasoning that it failed to 
prove all the prongs of the total cost method.63  Since the Federal 
Circuit concluded that the Board correctly denied the claim for 
failure to show the impracticability of proving its actual losses directly, 
it did not address whether the contractor failed to prove lack of 
responsibility for the added costs.64  The Federal Circuit affirmed,65 
thereby creating a decision which will make it more difficult for 
contractors to use the modified total cost or total cost methods to 
prove damages successfully. 
In its decision, the Federal Circuit agreed that substantial evidence 
supported the Board’s finding that Propellex failed to establish the 
impracticability of proving its actual costs directly.66  While the 
contractor could have set up a cost code to segregate the costs of its 
moisture investigation, it did not do so.67  Instead, the contractor 
believed itself responsible for the moisture problem, a belief which in 
the Federal Circuit’s opinion made segregation of investigation costs 
from costs incurred under the Army’s contracts all the more 
important.68  The court stated that whether the contracts were fixed 
price was not important because “where a contractor can capture its 
                                                          
 60. Id. at 1337-38. 
 61. Id. at 1338. 
 62. Id.  The four elements are:  (1) the impracticability of proving its actual losses 
directly; (2) the reasonableness of its bid; (3) the reasonableness of its actual costs; 
and (4) lack of responsibility for the added costs.  Id. 
 63. Id. at 1340. 
 64. Id.  But see supra note 10 and accompanying text (noting that in P.J. Dick Inc., 
the Federal Circuit addressed the standby issue for Eichleay proof, even though the 
court’s finding that the contractor did not need to prove legal entitlement to 
Eichleay damages rendered the standby discussion unnecessary). 
 65. Propellex Corp., 342 F.3d at 1340. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 1342. 
 68. Id. 
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increased costs . . . it should do so regardless of whether its contract is 
a fixed price contract.  This is good business practice, and fosters 
accountable and efficient contract performance.”69 
This reasoning is troublesome for several reasons.  There seems to 
be little logical basis to conclude that a fixed-price contractor should 
segregate costs relating to self-imposed problems.70  The contractor 
was entitled to be paid for supplies delivered—not for costs incurred.  
Whether the contract is a fixed-price contract or a cost-
reimbursement contract makes all the difference in determining how 
to account for costs during performance.  Fixed-price contractors 
have fewer overhead accounting costs because they spend less time 
tracking and documenting costs than cost-reimbursement 
contractors.  There are good reasons for the significant differences in 
how fixed-priced contractors and cost-reimbursement contractors 
track costs. 
In dismissing the fixed-price contract argument, the Federal 
Circuit observed the “good business practice” inherent in segregating 
increased costs for problems that the contractor believes itself 
responsible, even under a fixed-price contract.71  The Federal Circuit 
cited no evidence to support that conclusion.  The Federal Circuit 
also stated that regardless of whether it is a fixed-price contract, 
segregating costs for contractor problems on fixed-price contracts 
“fosters accountable and efficient contract performance.”72  If the 
Federal Acquisition Regulations (“FAR”), the contract, or general 
accounting principles do not require fixed-price contractors to 
segregate increased costs due to contractor-caused problems, it is 
difficult to understand why the Federal Circuit should impose such 
accounting practices.  It is one thing to penalize a contractor for 
failing to track increased costs due to government-caused problems 
when the contractor has reason and it is normal practice to do so.  It 
is another to penalize a contractor for failing to separately track costs 
under a fixed-price contract when it does not believe the government 
is responsible for them. 
The contractor also argued that the Board improperly cited the 
contractor’s ability to satisfy the fourth element of the total cost test 
as proof that it was practicable to satisfy the first element of the test, 
i.e., to estimate costs for the government-caused problems.73  The 
                                                          
 69. Id. at 1342 n.3. 
 70. Id. at 1342. 
 71. Id. at 1342 n.3. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 1343. 
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contractor argued that the Board’s logic essentially did away with a 
contractor’s ability to recover under a modified total cost approach, 
as the contractor’s deduction for non-government-caused problems 
will always be cited as proof that it could segregate costs for 
government-caused problems.74  In rejecting this argument, the 
Federal Circuit reasoned as a matter of law that a contractor will still 
be able to establish that its ability to segregate some costs does not 
automatically disprove the impracticability of proving the contractor’s 
losses directly.75  The problem with this legal conclusion is that, as a 
factual matter, the evidence cited to support the Board’s conclusion 
that the contractor could estimate costs for the government-caused 
moisture problem was the estimation and deduction of contractor-
caused extra costs by the contractor’s expert in the modified total 
cost claim.76  Ultimately, the Federal Circuit found that the Board 
correctly relied on Propellex’s calculations of costs unrelated to the 
moisture problem as evidence that it was not impracticable for 
Propellex to prove its losses directly.77  It is not clear how a contractor 
will be able to meet the first element of the test if the Board or court 
may factually defeat that element by pointing to the contractor’s 
ability to deduct contractor-caused costs.  Although a contractor can 
estimate and segregate contractor-caused extra costs, it does not 
necessarily mean it can do the same for government-caused extra 
costs.  This reasoning will only encourage the government to reject 
modified total costs claims whenever contractors do the right thing 
and deduct contractor-caused extra costs from the total cost claim. 
Propellex also argued that Servidone Construction Corp. v. United 
States78 supported Propellex’s claim since the volume of work in 
Propellex’s contract (number of primers supplied) did not increase, 
just as the volume of dirt to be excavated in Servidone Construction 
Corp. did not increase.79  In both cases, the “extra work” claims 
produced the same volume of work required under the contract.  In 
rejecting this argument, the Federal Circuit reasoned that in Servidone 
Construction Corp., there was no way for the contractor to segregate its 
extra costs, while Propellex could have tracked its extra costs.80 
                                                          
 74. Id. at 1340. 
 75. Id. at 1343. 
 76. Id. at 1342 n.4. 
 77. Id. at 1343. 
 78. 931 F.2d 860 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 79. Propellex Corp., 342 F.3d at 1343.  See Servidone Constr. Corp., 931 F.2d at 862 
(granting the contractor recovery under a modified total cost method). 
 80. Propellex Corp., 342 F.3d at 1343-44. 
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The Propellex decision will encourage further litigation over 
modified total cost claims.  The mere fact that a contractor deducts 
contractor-caused extra costs from its modified total cost claim 
should not be sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that it 
could have segregated the government-caused extra costs.  Nor 
should the Federal Circuit attempt to establish standards for proper 
accounting practices for contractors that are not reflected in FAR, 
general accounting principles, or the contract in question. 
III.  DAMAGES—LOST PROFITS 
In Rumsfeld v. Applied Companies, Inc.,81 the Defense Logistic Agency 
(“DLA”) breached its requirements contract with Applied 
Companies, Inc. (“Applied”).  DLA issued a request for proposals 
(“RFP”) to provide, among other things, cylinders to store 
refrigerants.82  The RFP estimated the DLA’s requirements to be 
120,000 cylinders of refrigerants during the term of the one-year 
contract.83  Prior to contract award, DLA determined that it would 
need only one-tenth of the estimated quantity.84  However, DLA did 
not notify the offerors of this change, and the notice of award to 
Applied included the estimate contained in the RFP.85  DLA did not 
inform Applied of the faulty estimate until one month into contract 
performance.86  DLA eventually ordered a total of 11,950 cylinders 
and sought to modify the contract to a new contract price.87  When 
Applied declined to supply at the government’s price, the 
government terminated the contract for convenience.88  None of the 
quantities were delivered.89  The contracting officer denied Applied’s 
claim for breach of contract and determined that DLA’s failure to 
exercise due care in preparation of its estimates gave rise to a 
constructive change entitling Applied only to an equitable 
adjustment.90  Applied appealed to the Board, which held that the 
DLA’s actions constituted a breach of contract that entitled Applied 
to compensatory damages and noted in passing that while its decision 
only addressed entitlement to breach, the contractor’s damages may 
                                                          
 81. 325 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 82. Id. at 1331. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 1332. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
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include anticipated profits.91  In a decision issued on December 10, 
2002, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s entitlement decision, 
finding that negligently prepared estimates may form the basis for a 
claim of breach of a requirements contract.92  On April 2, 2003, the 
Federal Circuit granted a Petition for Rehearing to correct factual 
misstatements in its previous decision, withdrew that opinion, and 
substituted a corrected opinion.93  The new opinion contained no 
substantive changes from the prior opinion. 
While the Board did not reach a decision on quantum, the Federal 
Circuit decided to provide guidance on the lost profits claim, given 
the Board’s passing comments on that issue.94  This case represented 
a first impression issue of whether lost profits under a requirements 
contract are recoverable on negligently prepared estimates, where 
none of the requirements were diverted to a third party.  Prior 
decisions addressing lost profits for breaches of requirements 
contracts involved diversion of requirements to third parties95 and 
approaching such awards in this manner provided the proof needed 
to meet the requirements of lost profits set forth in California Federal 
Bank v. United States.96  The Federal Circuit in Applied Companies 
concluded that an award of lost profits for all of the estimated 
120,000 cylinders would convert the contract from a requirements 
contract, where the government only orders its actual needs, to a 
guaranteed quantity contract.97  In addition, the Federal Circuit held 
that in this case the contractor could not establish that it would have 
made a profit had DLA issued proper estimates or told bidders that 
its estimates were inaccurate.98 
The Federal Circuit also concluded that lost profits in this case 
would allow the contractor to profit from DLA’s breach, because the 
                                                          
 91. Id. at 1333, 1335. 
 92. Rumsfeld v. Applied Cos., Inc., 318 F.3d 1317, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 93. Applied Cos., Inc., 325 F.3d at 1329-30. 
 94. Id. at 1335. 
 95. See Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc. v. Barram, 226 F.3d 1329, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 
2000) (reaffirming the availability of lost profits compensation when the government 
procures goods or services from a third party, thereby breaching a requirements 
contract); Torncello v. United States, 681 F.2d 756, 771 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (asserting that 
under a requirements contract, the termination for convenience clause does not 
permit the government to breach its only meaningful obligation by diverting 
business away from a contractor); Locke v. United States, 283 F.2d 521, 523 (Ct. Cl. 
1960) (holding that the claimant was entitled to compensation for its projected share 
of business stemming from a breached requirements contract). 
 96. 245 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (requiring a definite determination that the 
contractor would have made a profit, the amount of which may be reasonably 
estimated, and a showing that the lost profits were the proximate result of the 
breach). 
 97. Applied Cos., Inc., 325 F.3d at 1339. 
 98. Id. at 1340. 
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contractor would have earned a profit on the cylinders sold, or it 
would not have bid at all if the government had provided a 
reasonable estimate.99  To allow recovery on the full 120,000 
estimated quantity would place the contractor in a better position 
than if the DLA had never breached the contract by negligently 
providing the estimates.100  Thus, the contractor’s recovery is limited 
to an equitable adjustment in price of units delivered,101 or it is 
limited to a recovery for termination for convenience costs if the 
contractor did not deliver any cylinders.102 
The dissenting opinion by Judge Dyk presented a classic “Contracts 
101” debate over the standard of proof for an award of lost profits.  
Judge Dyk noted that in none of the negligent misrepresentation 
precedents cited by the majority did the contractor seek lost profits.103  
Citing the general law of contracts allowing lost profits based on the 
amounts of likely purchases, the dissent was particularly disturbed by 
the majority’s failure to provide the contractor an opportunity to 
prove foreseeability of likely purchases.104  The dissent argued that the 
majority decision will effectively permit the government to 
misrepresent its requirements without consequences in situations 
where the misrepresentation does not cause the contractor an 
increase in costs.105 
IV.  DEFAULT 
Several important decisions were issued in 2003, which defined 
standards of review to be utilized in reviewing the propriety of 
terminations for default.  
A.   McDonnell Douglas v. United States 
In McDonnell Douglas v. United States,106 the Federal Circuit issued its 
second opinion in the twelve years of litigation for this termination 
for default dispute.107  The first Federal Circuit opinion108 reversed the 
Court of Federal Claim’s (“CFC”) ruling that the Navy did not base its 
                                                          
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 1341. 
 102. Id. at 1342. 
 103. Id. at 1342-45 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 104. Id. at 1345. 
 105. Id. 
 106. 323 F.3d 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 107. See id. at 1010 (noting that this case arose in 1991 when the government 
defaulted on a contract with McDonnell Douglas for the development of a carrier-
based stealth aircraft). 
 108. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 182 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
PATIN.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC 6/22/2004  7:48 PM 
2004] 2003 GOVERNMENT CONTRACT DECISIONS 955 
decision to terminate on the contractor’s performance.109  The CFC 
misapplied Schlesinger v. United States,110 which barred default 
termination only where the termination had no connection to the 
contractor’s performance.111  Since the termination in this case 
related to the contractor’s performance, the Federal Circuit ordered 
a remand to determine if the contractor was in default.112 
On the first remand, the CFC sustained the trial court’s finding of 
default termination solely on the contractor’s failure to meet 
performance deadlines.113  The trial court improperly interpreted the 
Federal Circuit’s first decision as requiring the trial court to sustain 
the default as long as the delivery date was reasonable.114  The Federal 
Circuit rejected both parties’ plea to rule on the default termination 
and end the litigation on appeal, because the CFC record did not 
contain adequate factual findings to establish whether the contractor 
was in default.115  This second opinion provides guidance for applying 
the standard in Lisbon Contractors, Inc. v. United States116 for reviewing 
default termination. 
The Federal Circuit rejected the contractor’s position that the 
standard FAR default language, which permits default termination if 
the contractor “fails to . . . [p]rosecute the work so as to endanger 
performance of this contract,”117 allows for default termination only 
for absolute impossibility of performance or complete repudiation or 
abandonment by the contractor.118  Nor did the Federal Circuit 
accept the government’s position that prior default precedents did 
not apply, and that default termination is appropriate when a 
contractor expresses a concern that it may not be able to comply with 
a schedule milestone or specification requirements.119  The Federal 
                                                          
 109. Id. at 1326-27. 
 110. 390 F.2d 702 (1968) (finding that the government’s failure to provide 
constructive notice under a contract’s default termination provision rendered the 
government’s termination one of convenience, even though the termination 
occurred after the supplier failed to perform adequately under the contract). 
 111. McDonnell Douglas, 323 F.3d at 1013. 
 112. McDonnell Douglas, 182 F.3d at 1329. 
 113. McDonnell Douglas, 323 F.3d at 1011 (reiterating the CFC’s refusal to base its 
determination of justified default on the contractor’s alleged inability to perform the 
contact, anticipatory repudiation, or failure to comply with specific requirements). 
 114. See id. at 1012-13 (recalling that in its remand order, the Federal Circuit 
required the CFC to determine whether the government established default by the 
contractor, in which case the validity of the default termination should be upheld 
and the contractors would not recover under a convenience termination claim). 
 115. Id. at 1014. 
 116. 828 F.2d 759 (Fed. Cir. 1987).  See infra note 121 and accompanying text for 
discussion of the Lisbon Contractors, Inc. standard. 
 117. 48 C.F.R. § 52.249-9(a)(1)(ii) (1984). 
 118. McDonnell Douglas, 323 F.3d at 1014-15. 
 119. Id. at 1015. 
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Circuit held that interpretation of the FAR default provision requires 
a compromise between judicial aversion to default terminations and 
the government’s right to performance under the contract.120  It 
reaffirmed the “pragmatic approach” adopted in Lisbon Contractors, 
Inc., which requires the government to establish a reasonable belief 
that the contractor could not complete contract performance, with 
any reasonable likelihood, within the time remaining under the 
contract.121  A showing that the contractor fell behind schedule does 
not satisfy the government’s burden.122  There should be tangible, 
direct evidence showing objective factors to make this determination, 
such as:  testimony from the contracting officer; contemporaneous 
documents; a comparison of percentage of unfinished work to time 
left under the contract; a showing that the contractor failed to meet 
project milestones; and any relevant information about the 
contractor’s financial position and performance history.123 
In language which will often be quoted for what the government 
does not need to prove, the Federal Circuit held that the contracting 
officer does not have to prove he was in fact correct.124  The standard 
is whether the contracting officer was “justifiably insecure about the 
contract’s timely completion.”125  In doing so, the focus is on whether 
the contracting officer had a reasonable belief based upon facts 
leading up to the time of the default decision—not whether the 
decision was correct based on hindsight and post-termination facts.126  
The Federal Circuit remanded for a determination of whether the 
government proved that the contracting officer reasonably believed 
that there was no reasonable likelihood that the contractor could 
complete contract performance within the allotted time.127 
The Federal Circuit also ruled that the CFC correctly found the 
government’s unilateral imposition of a revised schedule to be 
reasonable based upon the methodical, comprehensive inquiry 
conducted by the Navy, taking into account all the issues and 
information available.128  This finding does not require an 
examination of the amount of unfinished work as of the date of issue 
of the unilateral schedule, or an analysis of how long it would take 
                                                          
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 1015-16. 
 122. Id. at 1016. 
 123. Id. at 1016-17. 
 124. Id. at 1017. 
 125. Id. at 1017 (citing Discount Co. v. United States, 554 F.2d 435, 441 (Fed. Cir. 
1997)). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 1018. 
 128. Id. at 1019. 
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the contractor to complete the work given its capacity.129  Although 
useful, such inquiries are not required to meet a reasonableness 
determination130 under DeVito v. United States.131 
The Federal Circuit rejected an “objective achievability” analysis 
since it would require a departure from the case law, and “would 
compel the government to have perfect prescience and be infallible 
in its decision.”132  Since the government conducted a methodical 
inquiry before imposing the new schedule on the contractor and 
“[took] into account all the issues and information then available to 
him,” including performance problems and the contractor’s track 
record and progress, the CFC properly found the revised date to be 
reasonable.133  Respected commentators contend that this decision is 
a significant departure from the case law because the trial court does 
not have to make an independent analysis of the facts.134  Rather, the 
new rule is whether the revised date is subjectively reasonable in the 
government’s view.   
The Federal Circuit’s reluctance to impose an “objective 
achievability” analysis on a unique major weapons contract is 
understandable given the lack of prior experience producing the 
deliverables.  However, the vast majority of default terminations 
involve more mundane construction and supply contracts where 
reliable, comparable contractor and industry performance 
experiences exist for an objective analysis of whether a revised 
schedule is reasonable or not.  Judges in future litigation over the 
more typical default terminations involving unilateral revised 
schedules will have to decide whether such objective data should have 
been considered by the contracting officer in unilaterally establishing 
a revised schedule.   
Thus, the court imposed, both for the default termination decision 
and for the unilateral imposition of a revised schedule decision, that 
                                                          
 129. Id. (stating that such a finding is based on what the government knew or 
should have known at the time it adopted the unilateral schedule). 
 130. Id. 
 131. 413 F.2d 1147, 1154 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (stating that where the government 
unilaterally sets a new date for performance, such date must be “both reasonable and 
specific from the standpoint of the performance capabilities of the contractor at the 
time notice is given.”). 
 132. McDonnell Douglas, 323 F.3d at 1019. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See Ralph C. Nash & John Cibinic, Postscript II:  The “A-12” Default Termination, 
17 NASH & CIBINIC REP. ¶ 38, at 74 (2003) (observing that judges in the past have 
conducted an independent assessment of the facts when determining whether a new 
date, independently imposed by the government, is objectively reasonable based on 
the contractor’s capabilities and what the government knew or should have known). 
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the standard of review should be based on whether the contracting 
officer reasonably utilized objective data to reach those decisions. 
The Federal Circuit also agreed that the contractor’s superior 
knowledge defense to the default should be dismissed, because it 
required discovery of information protected by the Military and 
States Secrets privilege, which the government properly invoked.135  
Similarly, the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause argument raised 
by the contractors was rejected136 based on the Supreme Court’s 
findings in United States v. Reynolds.137 
B.  Johnson v. All-State Construction 
In Johnson v. All-State Construction,138 the Navy appealed the decision 
of the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals that the Navy 
breached its contract with All-State Construction by withholding 
progress payments to offset liquidated damages.139  In granting 
summary judgment on the contractor’s breach of contract claim, the 
Board held that FAR 52.232-5(d) limited the amount of progress 
payments that the government could retain to a maximum of ten 
percent of the payment amount.140  As such, the Board found that the 
Navy’s retention of thirty-eight percent of All-State’s progress 
payments breached the contract, and the Board converted the 
default termination to one for convenience.141 
The Federal Circuit held that, absent a contract clause permitting 
the government to retain progress payments in anticipation of default 
termination, the Navy may not retain payments over and above the 
ten percent retainage right under FAR 52.232-5(d).142  However, the 
government may exercise its common law right of set-off to retain 
payments to cover the liquidated damages due the government.143  
                                                          
 135. McDonnell Douglas, 323 F.3d at 1020-21 (noting that the Military and States 
Secrets privilege can preclude discovery of information that might adversely affect 
national security). 
 136. Id. at 1023 (rejecting the contractor’s argument that the Fifth Amendment 
Due Process Clause trumps the Military and State Secrets privilege and requires the 
government either to disclose the classified information or to forego the default 
termination action). 
 137. 345 U.S. 1 (1953) (finding that in a civil matter, the government’s invocation 
of a privilege does not disadvantage the opposing party in the same way that such a 
privilege deprives a criminal defendant of information necessary to his defense, 
especially since the government was also responsible for raising the criminal charges 
in the first place). 
 138. 329 F.3d 848 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 139. Id. at 850. 
 140. Id. at 851. 
 141. Id. at 851. 
 142. Id. at 851-52. 
 143. Id. at 852. 
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This right of set-off is not limited by the retainage clause, FAR 52.232-
5(d), or the set-off clause in the contract, because the contract 
provisions do not contain specific language defeating the 
government’s right to set-off.144  Reciting the set-off requirements of 
Citizens Bank of Maryland v. Strumpf,145 the Federal Circuit held that 
the government properly exercised its right to set-off by taking the 
following steps:  “(i) a decision to effectuate a setoff, (ii) some action 
accomplishing the setoff, and (iii) a recording of the setoff.”146  
Finally, the court found that the Navy may demand liquidated 
damages pursuant to set-off rights prior to making a final decision to 
terminate the contract even though the contractor is still performing 
under the contract.147 
C.  Copeland v. Secretary of Agriculture 
In Copeland v. Secretary of Agriculture,148 the contractor’s employees 
reported $37,905 in Davis Bacon Act (“DBA”) violations to the Forest 
Service’s contracting officer.149  The contracting officer withheld and 
delayed payment of progress payments based on the possible DBA 
violations.150  Copeland’s performance was delayed and the 
government eventually terminated both contracts for default.151  
Copeland appealed to the Board of Contract Appeals, which 
dismissed the appeal based on a pending decision of Copeland’s DBA 
violations by a Department of Labor (“DOL”) administrative law 
judge (“ALJ”).152  Five years after Copeland’s default terminations, the 
ALJ dismissed the DBA charges based on the DOL’s original delay in 
prosecuting the violations.153  The government appealed, and the ALJ 
held that Copeland violated the DBA in the amount of $3,951, but 
dismissed the charges based on the DOL’s administrative delay.154  
Subsequently, Copeland appealed the default terminations to the 
Board.  The Board held that absent a showing that the Forest Service 
inappropriately withheld payments, Copeland did not demonstrate 
cause for altering the Forest Service’s default termination.155 
                                                          
 144. Id. at 853-54. 
 145. 516 U.S. 16, 19 (1995). 
 146. Johnson, 329 F.3d at 854. 
 147. Id. at 855. 
 148. 350 F.3d 1230 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 149. Id. at 1231. 
 150. Id. at 1231-32. 
 151. Id. at 1232. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 1232-33 (citing Bill Copeland, AGBCA Nos. 1999-182-1 to -187-1, 2000-
147-1 to -148-1, 02-2 B.C.A. (CCH) ¶¶ 32,049, 158,404 (2002)). 
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Copeland contended that its performance on the contracts was 
delayed based on the government’s excessive withholding of progress 
payments.156  The Federal Circuit ruled that a different standard is 
applied to DBA withholdings than withholdings for set-offs.157  While 
set-off withholdings are only proper if the set-off amount is properly 
calculated, DBA withholdings are “proper as long as the amount 
withheld depended on a reasonable judgment of the contracting 
officer that the withheld amounts were needed to protect the 
employees’ interests.”158  Notwithstanding the long delay in DOL 
proceedings, the burden remained on the contractor to prove that its 
delay in performance due to the improper DBA withholdings was 
excusable, largely because the contractor had “ample opportunity” to 
prove the DBA violations false or owed in a lesser amount.159  The 
Federal Circuit noted that given the extraordinary delay in the DOL 
decision-making process, if the contractor could have asked the 
contracting officer to release the funds with documentation to 
support his position that proper withholdings were made, the result 
of this case would have been different.160 
V.  COSTS 
 The Federal Circuit issued two significant cost decisions in 2003 
interpreting (1) the interplay between FAR and cost accounting 
standards principles on asset write-up allowability, and (2) the 
recovery of defense legal costs under FAR. 
A.  Kearfott Guidance & Navigation Corp. v. Secretary of Defense 
In Kearfott Guidance & Navigation Corp. v. Secretary of Defense,161 the 
contractor submitted progress payment requests to the Navy, which 
included costs attributable to an increase in valuation of its assets 
during another company’s purchase of Kearfott.162  The Navy 
contended the amounts attributable to the asset write-up were not 
allowable.163  Kearfott appealed to the Armed Services Board of 
Contract Appeals, which held that FAR 31.205-52 barred Kearfott 
from recovering its costs associated with the increased asset 
                                                          
 156. Id. at 1233. 
 157. Id. at 1234. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 1234-35. 
 160. Id. at 1235. 
 161. 320 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 162. Id. at 1371-72. 
 163. Id. at 1372. 
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valuation.164  The Board held that the FAR language applied to 
Kearfott’s business combination and did not conflict with Cost 
Accounting Standards (“CAS”), because the FAR language governed 
allowability and not allocability.165 
The Federal Circuit upheld the Board’s decision and determined 
that FAR 31.205-52 is an allowability provision and does not conflict 
with CAS allocability principles.166  Kearfott argued that the 1990 FAR 
regulation did not apply retroactively to a 1988 business 
transaction.167  The Federal Circuit disagreed with Kearfott’s 
retroactivity rationale and held that the critical date for determining 
the regulation’s applicability is the cost claim’s submission date.168  
Moreover, the Federal Circuit held that Kearfott’s interpretation 
would create an “anomalous and cumbersome two-tiered system of 
cost accounting.”169  The asset write-up limitations would govern 
businesses that combined after the 1990 FAR Regulation while 
excluding earlier business combinations, even if the government 
contract in such earlier instances was executed after 1990.170  Thus, 
the FAR regulation covers business combinations prior to 1990.  The 
Federal Circuit also reasoned that the application of FAR 31.205-52 
did not affect Kearfott’s vested rights, and therefore, created no 
retroactivity problem.171 
Kearfott also contended that the application of the FAR regulation 
to the business combination causes the FAR regulation to conflict 
with CAS 404 and 409.172  The Federal Circuit rejected Kearfott’s 
interpretation because it would lead to the invalidation of the FAR 
regulation pre-1995 when the CAS provisions were modified to 
comport with the FAR regulation.173  Kearfott argued that the FAR 
regulation operates as an allocability rule and where FAR and CAS 
conflict regarding allocability, CAS governs.174  The government 
contended that the FAR regulation operates like a Defense 
Acquisition Regulation provision which requires that general and 
administrative expenses be allocated to individual costs in the G&A 
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base and which was held to be an allowability provision.175  Thus, the 
Federal Circuit determined that the success of Kearfott’s argument 
rested on whether the FAR regulation is an allocability or allowability 
regulation.176  It determined that the FAR regulation was an 
allowability regulation and held that: 
Nothing in FAR 31.205-52 precludes contractors from measuring 
and allocating their costs pursuant to the protocol set forth in the 
pertinent CAS provisions.  The FAR provision therefore has no 
impact on the measurement and assignment of costs under CAS to 
a contractor’s commercial contracts.  Rather, the FAR provision 
merely operates as an after-the-fact ceiling on the extent to which 
certain costs will be allowed once they have been allocated among 
the acquired asset values under the CAS provisions.177 
Relying on the administrative history of the FAR regulation, the 
Federal Circuit held that the FAR functioned as an allowability rule, 
which did not conflict with CAS.178  Therefore, Kearfott’s costs for 
asset write-ups were not recoverable.179 
B.  Brownlee v. DynCorp 
In Brownlee v. DynCorp,180 the contractor, DynCorp, won a cost-plus-
award-fee contract for base support services from the Army.181  Soon 
thereafter, the government began to investigate criminal allegations 
against DynCorp, including recording of false data, fraudulent 
documentation, and fraudulent use of government credit cards.182  
DynCorp expended legal fees to defend itself and its employees, 
which concluded in a plea agreement by its branch manager.183  
DynCorp submitted a claim to the government for its defense costs, 
which excluded those costs specifically expended in defending the 
branch manager.184  The government denied DynCorp’s claim, and it 
appealed to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals.185  The 
Board accepted the government’s argument that, pursuant to FAR 
31.205-47(b), a contractor could not recover defense costs when a 
proceeding resulted in the conviction of an agent or employee of the 
                                                          
 175. Id. at 1376. 
 176. See id. at 1375-76. 
 177. Id. at 1377. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. 349 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 181. Id. at 1345. 
 182. Id. at 1346. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
PATIN.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC 6/22/2004  7:48 PM 
2004] 2003 GOVERNMENT CONTRACT DECISIONS 963 
contractor but not the contractor itself.186  However, the Board found 
the regulation was inconsistent with the Major Fraud Act of 1988,187 
which makes contractor costs allowable in part.188  Therefore, the 
regulation was a “nullity.”189  The Board remanded the case to 
determine quantum in DynCorp’s favor.190 
In defending the Board’s decision, DynCorp contended that 
(1) the FAR provision should not apply when only the employee, not 
the contractor, is convicted, and (2) if the Federal Circuit construes 
the FAR provision to disallow recovery of defense costs associated 
with employee convictions, the regulation is invalid in light of the 
Major Fraud Act of 1988, which makes “contractor” costs allowable in 
part.191  The Federal Circuit rejected DynCorp’s interpretation of the 
regulation and held that FAR 31.205-47(b) defines the term 
“contractor” to include both the contractor and its employees.192  
Thus, the FAR regulation disallows not only the cost of defending the 
employee, but all costs of the proceeding, including the cost of 
defending the contractor, even though the contractor itself was not 
convicted.193 
In addressing the contractor’s second argument, the Federal 
Circuit found that the Major Fraud Act was ambiguous, and that 
legislative history did not resolve the ambiguity in favor of the 
contractor’s interpretation.194  Turning to the analysis under Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,195 the court found 
that the FAR regulations should be afforded deference under Chevron 
and concluded that FAR 31.205-47(b) specifically, given its 
reasonable interpretation, was entitled to the same deference and was 
binding.196  Even if the statutory term “contractor” could be construed 
to exclude employees, the Federal Circuit held the Secretary of 
Defense was authorized to adopt supplemental cost disallowance 
rules going beyond the statute to include the contractor’s agents or 
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employees.197  The Federal Circuit held that the 1988 Act did not 
change that approach, because the Act allowed defense costs in part, 
where there was no conviction, but only if allowable under the FAR.198 
The Federal Circuit remanded the case to determine whether the 
costs were incurred in a separate proceeding from that which 
DynCorp’s branch manager plead guilty and whether they involved 
the same misconduct.199 
VI.  CONTRACT INTERPRETATION 
The decisions in 2003 further reflect the Federal Circuit’s strong 
preference for the plain meaning approach to contract 
interpretation. 
A.  WDC W. Carthage Associates v. United States 
WDC W. Carthage Associates v. United States,200 involved a military 
housing lease providing that the contractor/developer will repair any 
damages, beyond normal wear and tear, caused by the government or 
occupant.201  The “cost of such repairs” would be paid by the 
government.202  Although the government initially paid the full 
invoiced charges for carpet replacements due to damage beyond 
normal wear and tear, after several years, the government announced 
it would only pay the replacement cost less a prorated amount for 
normal wear and tear on the carpets.203 
The Court of Federal Claims (“CFC”) agreed with the 
government’s contract interpretation on a motion for summary 
judgment.  The Federal Circuit reversed, rejecting the CFC’s reliance 
on landlord-tenant case law to interpret the lease’s meaning since 
none of those cases dealt with the specific contract language at 
hand.204  Instead, it found that the “plain terms” of the leases required 
the government to pay the full cost of carpet replacements made 
necessary by damage beyond normal wear and tear, without any 
allowance for depreciation.205  The Federal Circuit rejected the 
government’s “economic windfall” argument, that full 
reimbursement for replacement carpeting prior to the end of the 
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carpet’s useful life gives the contractors an economic windfall, since it 
was not the court’s duty to rewrite the terms of the lease.206  The court 
also relied on the parties’ past conduct, specifically, the government’s 
initial payment of full replacement cost, as evidence of the proper 
construction of the leases.207  The rejection of the government’s 
economic windfall argument is particularly noteworthy in this 
decision. 
B.  Forman v. United States 
In Forman v. United States,208 Forman sought reimbursement of 
expenses allegedly incurred pursuant to a pre-indictment plea 
agreement with the Federal Bureau of Investigations (“FBI”).209  
Under that agreement, Forman pledged to cooperate in the 
establishment of a textile company, which would facilitate the FBI’s 
investigation of a long-time clothing industry consultant.210  The FBI, 
in turn, agreed to reimburse Forman for certain expenses and to 
allow Forman to keep any profits arising from the legitimate 
operation of the business.211  Forman submitted a reimbursement 
request, which the FBI denied on the grounds that Forman had failed 
to obtain FBI authorization prior to incurring the expenses.212  
Forman filed suit in the CFC, which granted summary judgment in 
the government’s favor because Forman failed to obtain FBI approval 
prior to incurring the expenses as required by their agreement. 213 
The Federal Circuit rejected the government’s contention that the 
contract required Forman to obtain express or “specific” pre-approval 
before incurring reimbursable expenses.214  Rather, the plain 
language required Forman to consult with an FBI representative 
prior to incurring expenses as to the nature and purpose of the 
expenses.215  The agreement provided that the FBI would instruct 
Forman not to proceed if the FBI determined the expenses 
unnecessary for its goals.216 
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C.  Rumsfeld v. Freedom NY, Inc. 
In Rumsfeld v. Freedom NY, Inc.,217 the United States appealed a 
decision of the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals finding 
invalid the contractor’s release of potential claims against the 
government contained in two modifications to a contract.218  The 
supply contract involved Meal, Ready to Eat (“MRE”) combat rations 
for the Defense Logistics Agency.219  When the contractor repeatedly 
missed deadlines for delivery of MREs, the government terminated 
the contract for default.220  The contractor brought a claim for breach 
of contract, constructive change, and improper default termination 
in 1991.221 
Prior to termination of the contract, the parties entered into 
contract modifications extending delivery dates and making a price 
adjustment, in exchange for the release of claims.222  For one of the 
modifications, the contractor claimed, and the government denied, 
the existence of a side agreement with the government to negotiate a 
contract for the supply of additional MREs beginning in 1987.223  The 
Board found that a valid side agreement existed based upon the 
contractor’s letters sent before the execution of the modification and 
the fact that the contracting officer never objected to the contents of 
the letters at the time.224  The contract contained an integration 
clause, and the Board found that the side agreement was a part of the 
modification, despite contrary testimony from the contracting officer, 
which the Board did not find credible.225  Therefore, the contractor’s 
release of claims against the government contained in the 
modification could not be enforced due to the government’s breach 
of the modification. 
The Federal Circuit reversed, strongly endorsing the FAR’s policy 
of settling disputes through modifications, which should be enforced 
“absent a clear showing of invalidity.”226  The parole evidence rule 
does not apply to allow the inclusion of additional terms when the 
modification is completely integrated.227  Integration clauses, while 
not dispositive, create a strong presumption of a fully-integrated 
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agreement.228  Use of extrinsic evidence with an integration clause 
should be “extremely limited,”229 such as when the document is 
obviously incomplete, or the merger clause was induced by fraud, 
mistakes or other reasons to set aside the contract.230  If there was a 
side agreement, the contractor should have stricken or modified the 
integration clause.231  The court held that the modification was an 
integrated document, and therefore the parole evidence rule did not 
allow the inclusion of additional terms.232 
In a per curiam decision on a petition for panel rehearing and 
rehearing en banc,233 the Federal Circuit affirmed its prior decision 
and rejected Freedom’s argument that the side agreement was 
integrated into the modification by virtue of a letter attached to the 
modification containing the agreement.234  The court on re-hearing 
also reaffirmed that mere attachment cannot bind a party.235  Rather, 
documents must clearly indicate that the attachments are to be 
considered part of the contract.236 
This decision provides clear guidance and warning for unwary 
contractors signing contract modifications.  If there is an integration 
clause in the modification, it will be enforced.  If the parties did not 
intend the modification’s release language to cover impact or delay 
damages, one cannot rely on parole evidence, such as prior letters or 
discussions, or post-modification conduct to argue different intent to 
avoid the effect of the release language when the contract contains 
an integration clause. 
VII.  DURESS 
In the initial Freedom NY, Inc. case discussed above, the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the Board’s finding that the modification’s release 
was unenforceable because of duress.237  Citing the standard three 
part test for duress,238 the government withheld a $700,000 progress 
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payment, which the parties agreed caused the contractor to sign the 
modification with the release.239  A coercive act need not be illegal.240  
Coercion may be shown by breach of an express contract term 
without a good faith belief the action is permissible under the 
contract.241  Here, the government withheld the approved progress 
payment for the sole purpose of pressuring the contractor to sign the 
modification, which was not a reason listed under the contract for 
withholding a payment.242  Thus, the government did not have a good 
faith belief that such a withholding was permissible.243  In an 
important amplification of case law, the Federal Circuit rejected the 
government’s argument that it withheld the payment in good faith 
due to the government’s belief that the contractor defaulted, as this 
justification was made after-the-fact.244  The wrongfulness of the 
government’s action must be judged at the time it was taken.245 
VIII.  BID PROTESTS 
 The issue of clarifications and discussions often arise in bid 
protests involving negotiated procurements.  In Information Technology 
& Applications Corp. v. United States,246 the protestor appealed from the 
decision of the CFC denying its post-award bid protest.  The protestor 
complained, in part, that the Air Force violated 41 U.S.C. § 253b and 
48 C.F.R. § 15.306, by conducting “discussions” with another bidder 
(“RSIS”) and not with it (“ITAC”).  According to ITAC, the 
discussions were in the form of evaluation notices (“ENs”) to RSIS 
that revealed past performance deficiencies and requested additional 
information regarding performance.  The CFC held that the ENs 
were not “discussions” within the meaning of FAR 15.306(d) because 
the agency had not made a determination of the competitive range 
or allowed the offerors to correct deficiencies by revising their 
proposals. 
The Federal Circuit affirmed, citing revised regulatory language to 
distinguish between “discussions” and “clarifications.”  The Federal 
Circuit held that ENs were not “discussions” because RSIS did not 
have the opportunity to revise its proposal.  The court held ENs were 
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requests for clarification under 48 C.F.R. § 15.306(a)(2) which 
provides that offerors “may be given the opportunity to clarify certain 
aspects of proposals” and one aspect being described as “an offer’s 
past performance information.”  The ENs issued to RSIS sought 
additional information to verify relevant past performance of 
subcontractors and, thus, were clarifications.  Rejecting the use of 
dictionary definitions to interpret the statute, the Federal Circuit gave 
deference to FAR definitions of the terms,247 as they represented “a 
reasonable interpretation of the statutory terms.”248  The Federal 
Circuit also rejected ITAC’s argument that ENs were not clarifications 
because they requested additional information.  Any meaningful 
clarification requires the offeror provide additional information to 
the agency.249 
CONCLUSION 
The government contract decisions issued in 2003 reflect 
important developments in damages and default case law.  The 
Boards of Contract Appeals and the Court of Federal Claims will have 
difficulty in uniformly applying these precedents.  The Eichleay and 
modified total cost decisions discussed herein reflect the Federal 
Circuit’s continuing difficulty in applying rather simple damages 








                                                          
 247. Id. at 1320-21. 
 248.  Id. at 1322. 
 249.  Id. at 1324. 
